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 Recent advances in computer hardware security research have shown that 
electronic devices are vulnerable to electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage. An 
attacker can steal sensitive information from an electronic device that is not connected to 
the network just by measuring the electromagnetic emanations produced by the device. 
The feasibility of a successful EM side-channel attack has grown significantly in recent 
years with the reduction in cost of electronic test equipment and the proliferation of 
electronic devices. Smartcards, cellphones, and laptops can be susceptible to side-channel 
attacks, and with the trend towards internet-of-things (IoT) and millions of connected 
devices, the side-channel will become of increasing security importance. While most of 
the current literature in electromagnetic side-channels focuses on demonstrating novel 
attack methods on various devices, relatively little research focuses on characterizing the 
EM emanations. Research presented in this thesis aims to develop a metric to measure the 
side-channel energy per instruction available to an attacker. The importance of this is to 
understand the effect of instruction level events (i.e. ADD, LOAD, NOP) on the 
electromagnetic emanations from a cellphone. Understanding the correlation between the 
instruction run and the corresponding electromagnetic footprint can help to understand 
which operations cause the greatest amount of electromagnetic leakage as well as provide 
a basis of measurement. In addition, a method of localization is proposed to identify the 
source of the EM emanations. A magnetic dipole equivalent source model is proposed 
and measurement results are compared with simulation results of the model. These results 
aim to provide a deeper insight into the nature of electromagnetic side-channels as well as 
provide hardware and software designers with the information needed to combat 






Introduction to Side-Channels  
 A side-channel is a type of an attack that exploits the information obtained purely from 
hardware leakages during normal operation of an electronic device. This does not require access 
to the device through a network connection, and as a result, side-channels are often able to by-
pass normal network security measures. The susceptibility devices to side-channel leakage has 
been known about for many years, but the feasibility of a successful attack has grown greatly in 
recent years with the reduction in cost of electronic test equipment and the proliferation of 
electronic devices. Smartcards, cellphones, and laptops can be susceptible to side-channel 
attacks, and with the trend towards internet-of-things (IoT) and millions of connected devices, 
the side-channel will become of increasing security importance.  
 Types of side-channel attacks include but are not limited to power analysis, timing 
analysis, and electromagnetic emanations analysis. Power analysis focuses on the total power 
consumption of a hardware device. A theoretical attack would have an attacker place a power 
(current) meter at the power supply of a device, i.e. at the power cord for a laptop, and then 
monitor the power usage with an oscilloscope. Timing analysis focuses on the computational 
time it takes a processor to perform certain tasks. This is mainly exploited during a cryptographic 
encryption in which queries are sent to the computer to retrieve the cryptographic key by 
measuring the time it takes for the computer to perform the encryption and respond. 
Electromagnetic side-channel attacks exploit the electromagnetic radiation produced by an 
electronic device. As opposed to timing and power, electromagnetic emanations can be received 





 In contrast to side-channels, which are used to eavesdrop on a computing device, covert-
channels are used to send secret information. An electromagnetic covert-channel is particularly 
intrusive attack because it is very difficult to detect a malicious code that is inserted into the 
device under attack and leaks sensitive information through an EM side-channel. For example, 
an attacker contributes to an open-source code and inserts the malicious code intended to leak 
sensitive user information. The malicious code passes the audit, because it does not access any 
network or hardware peripherals that are uncommon for such a device. Once the code gets 
distributed to targeted cellphones, the attacker can then monitor the channel and demodulate the 
encoded signal while the user under attack has no knowledge of such a signal being leaked.  
Detecting and Measuring Side-Channel Signals 
 The side-channel electromagnetic energy radiated by an electronic device is very difficult 
to measure. The energy spread out in frequency content, making it indistinguishable from 
environmental EM noise. A methodology can be used to measure side-channel energy that 
exploits repetition in code (for- and while-loops), in which operations exciting the same circuitry 
for extended amounts of time will produce a strong electromagnetic signal at the frequency of 
operation (duration of the code loop). This methodology is explained in greater detail later, and 




Figure 1. A spectrum of ESE generated using “covert-channel” approach proposed in 
[10,11]. 
 
 During normal operation of the phone, there is no signal at this frequency; however, the 
attacker forces signal at this frequency to leak sensitive information. It is only covert because the 
existence of the communication channel is unbeknownst to the victim. The victim can view the 
frequency spectrum of his or her phone, but will not be able to easily tell if the phone is under a 
covert channel attack. A broadband scan of the frequency content being emitted during operation 
of the phone from a few kilohertz to a few gigahertz shows many frequency peaks; however, it is 
difficult to know which is leaking sensitive information, if any. The channel is visible to anyone 
that is “snooping” and knows where to look. 
Overview 
 The findings in this research aim to develop an understanding of the physical causes of 
side-channel leakage and to demonstrate the viability of such an attack. First, a methodology for 
measuring the electromagnetic side channel energy available to an attacker for instruction level 
events is proposed. The importance of this is to understand the effect of instruction level events 
(i.e. ADD, LOAD, NOP) on the electromagnetic emanations from a cellphone. Understanding 
the correlation between the instruction run and the corresponding electromagnetic footprint can 
help to understand which operations cause the greatest amount of electromagnetic leakage as 
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well as provide a basis of measurement. Then, a methodology for approximating an equivalent 
magnetic dipole source for electromagnetic side-channel signals is proposed and tested. This is 
important to understand the equivalent path a strong, emanating signal takes when it gets 
processed. This path depends on a significant number of factors, but general conclusions can be 
made about the nature of these signals. Finally, a review of the results and a summary of 
electromagnetic side-channels aims to provide a deeper insight into the fundamental causes of 
the EM leakages.  
 All this information is important for hardware engineers to design shielding techniques 
that attack the problem at its source. Hardware shielding implementations can be prioritized for 
particularly leaky components. Also, assembly programmers can avoid the unnecessary use of 
certain instruction level operations, such as memory accesses, that leak valuable information. 
Solutions that focus on a single implementation of a cryptographic algorithm do not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the cause of EM side-channels, and general solutions require a 






 A side-channel is a type of attack that exploits the information obtained from hardware 
leakages during the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. Types of side-channel 
attacks include power analysis, timing analysis, and electromagnetic emanations. While power 
and timing have been studied extensively, electromagnetic emanations provide a more powerful 
channel of attack. As opposed to power, electromagnetic emanations can be received and 
measured at a distance away from the source, making it ideal for eavesdropping. In addition, 
electromagnetic signals are more powerful, and different components leak different 
compromising information providing an attacker with multiple sources or channels to attack [1].  
 An electromagnetic side-channel attack is a non-intrusive attack in which the computer 
activity is monitored at a distance using an EM measurement setup. Smartcards and computer 
monitors have been shown to be susceptible to EM side-channels [2] [3]. Also, increasingly more 
complex processors such as field programmable gate array (FPGA) processors running AES 
encryption algorithms have been attacked [4]. Most recently, electromagnetic fields from laptops 
and desktops have been characterized, and implementations of cryptographic algorithms have 
been attacked [5]. However, while there has been research in methods of attacking processors via 
electromagnetic side-channels, there is still relatively little knowledge as to what exactly 
produces these side-channels or how they are produced.  
 Electromagnetic side-channels were first documented in the open literature as early as the 
1960's. The consensus at the time was that the attacks were unreliable and could only be realized 
with expensive hardware. As a result, electromagnetic side-channel shielding and 
countermeasure techniques remained confined to defense and intelligence use and TEMPEST 
guidelines were put in place for military equipment to limit the potential for information leakage 
due to electromagnetic (EM) emanations [6]. There was little public and commercial interest 
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until 1985, when Wim van Eck showed that an electromagnetic side-channel attack could 
reconstruct the information displayed on cathode ray tube (CRT) computer screens from 
hundreds of meters away using inexpensive hardware (< $50 worth of equipment) [3]. This was 
the first time commercial electronics were attacked, and there was a spike in public interest. 
Academic interest soon developed around providing side-channel security measures, and it led to 
innovative research in electromagnetic side-channel attacks and countermeasure techniques.  
 In particular, significant interest developed around the electromagnetic side-channels of 
computer processors. Computer processors execute programs and contain much of the 
information that is of interest to attackers. To avoid attacks, processors often run encryption 
algorithms to encode information. However, the implementation of these algorithms is often 
repetitive in nature making them susceptible to emitting electromagnetic radiation. The first 
work on processor side-channels focused on smartcard processors [2]. Smartcard processors have 
relatively few electronic connections and are simple architecturally which make them relatively 
susceptible to attack. For example, smartcard processors running cryptographic implementations 
of DES (Data Encryption Standard), COMP128, and RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) were 
attacked successfully and each time the complete encryption key material was obtained [7].  
 Research extended to more complex processors, and methods were developed for 
attacking cryptographic implementations in field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and laptops. 
FPGA processors running an implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) were 
successfully attacked using differential electromagnetic analysis [4]. More recently, laptops 
running RSA and El-Gamal encryption algorithms were successfully attacked through 
electromagnetic side-channels and the entire key was retrieved. Furthermore, the laptop attack 
was performed with inexpensive, low-bandwidth, low-frequency hardware and targeted the side-
channels of the laptop without physical access to the device [5]. These successful attacks on 
complex processors demonstrate that electromagnetic side-channels are powerful enough to 
attack processors with multiple chips, high clock rate, and asynchronous mechanisms. Most 
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importantly, all of this information is gathered without physical connection to the device other 
than the propagation of EM waves. 
 Once it was proven that electromagnetic side-channels provide a viable method of attack 
on computer processors, interest developed in designing countermeasures against such attacks. 
Usually, papers presenting a method of side-channel attack will also present general 
countermeasure methods and techniques. Countermeasures can be either hardware or software 
specific. Main hardware countermeasures focus on shielding techniques. Shielding is a method 
of enclosing particularly leaky electrical components so that the EM radiation does not propagate 
as far. Other techniques involve intelligent circuit design board layout to reduce electromagnetic 
leakage caused by processor activity. VLSI design flow can be designed to effectively shield 
integrated circuits from side-channel analysis by obtaining constant power dissipation of secure 
ICs [8]. On the software side, countermeasures mainly focus on asynchronous timing 
mechanisms and irregular cache accesses [9]. 
 While there has been extensive research in electromagnetic side-channels, there is still 
relatively little knowledge as to what exactly produces these side-channels or how they are 
produced. Preliminary research showed there are effects in propagation distance depending on 
the activity levels and data values used in accessing memory [10]. Depending on the cache level 
hit or off-chip memory access, EM side-channel attacks could be performed on these systems up 
to several meters and through structural walls. A metric for measuring the signal available to 
attacker (SAVAT), was proposed to compare electromagnetic emanations of different machine 
level instructions. The results confirm off-chip memory accesses produce the strongest 
electromagnetic leakages [11].  
 This research proposes to extend current research in the area of EM side-channels by 
creating a methodology of measuring the electromagnetic side channel energy available to an 
attacker for instruction level events on the FPGA processor. The development of a pairwise 
metric for one instruction level operation versus another would allow for the characterization of 
electromagnetic fields produced by the processor. For example, low-level software programmers 
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can write code that avoids the unnecessary repetition of loops and subroutines. In addition, 
current intensive operations such as load and store from memory could be avoided to reduce the 
amount of signal produced in the source code, instead of shielding or jamming strong signals 
after they are produced. On the other hand, repetitive operations such as "ADD/ADD" and 
"SUB/SUB" should not produce a measurable signal in the frequency domain.  
 In addition to understanding the effect of different instruction pairs, the characterization 
of the strength of the EM fields coming from FPGA boards would provide information about 
where the strongest signals on the processor are produced. The goal is to build upon current 
research done on laptops and desktops and localize the electromagnetic emanations coming from 
the FPGA board to understand which components are particularly accessible to side-channel 
attacks. For precise and accurate measurements, the FPGA is used for its defined layout and 
accessible peripherals. Characterization and localization of electromagnetic fields will advance 
current research in electromagnetic side-channels and greatly benefit hardware and software 
designers. Instead of designing hardware and software countermeasures for specific computer 
systems or software implementations, solutions that attack electromagnetic side-channels at the 





 Electromagnetic noise is any electromagnetic signal other than the desired signal that is 
present in a circuit. There are many causes of electromagnetic noise in electronic circuits. An 
engineer must take all of these in to account when testing and evaluating if a product is market 
ready. However, for our purpose, we can abstract all the different factors contributing to EM 
emission, and model the radiated emission based on top level parameters of a digital circuit. The 
radiation from a digital circuit can be described as either differential or common mode.  
 Differential-mode radiation is a result of current flowing in through the conductors in a 
circuit due to normal operation of the circuit. This current loop is a small loop antenna that will 
radiate a near-zone magnetic field.  
 
Figure 2. Differential mode radiation as illustrated in [12]. 
 Common-mode radiation is produced when parasitics are introduced into the circuit and 
there is a voltage drop in the conductors in the circuit. This is usually caused when cables are 
connected to the circuit that have a different ground potential than that in the circuit, which 
creates a voltage drop, and a current that radiates a near-zone electric field.  
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Figure 3. Common-mode radiation as illustrated in [12] 
 Differential-mode radiation models the radiation of a circuit during normal circuit 
operation, so it is of most interest to understanding EM side-channel leakage. The magnitude of 
the electric far-field can be approximated by the Kraus and Marhefka eqn. for a circular loop 
antenna over a ground plane [12]. 
 
 From the equation, it is evident that the differential-mode radiation can be suppressed by 
reducing the magnitude of the current, reducing the frequency of operation, or by reducing the 
loop area (the radiation of the small loop is dependent only on the area of the small loop and 
independent of the shape). A circuit board layout designer has little control over the magnitude 
of the current or frequency of operation of the circuit, but important consideration can be given 
the size of the loop. Special concern should be given to circuits in which the signal is periodic 
because all of the electromagnetic energy is concentrated at one frequency. For example, clock 
signals for the PCB operate at one frequency (usually the highest frequency on the PCB board), 
and so all the energy is concentrated in a few frequency bands including lower order harmonics. 
However, periodic signals such as the clock (CLK) signal, address latch enable (ALE), etc. and 
their respective EM frequency footprints are well understood, and their respective circuits are 





A Method for Measuring Side-Channel Energy Available to the Attacker 
Measuring one instruction level event versus another is very difficult and inconsistent. 
The frequency domain signature of a single instruction is hardly above the noise floor or at the 
noise floor. A better solution for measuring the energy per instruction is to measure the signal 
received when running multiple instructions and divide by the number of instructions. This is 
done by programming the FPGA to run two loops of code, one loop for one operation and the 
other for another set of operations. These alternating loops of operation can be adjusted to run at 
some carrier frequency that is tunable by altering the number of instructions in each for loop.  
Once the electromagnetic side-channel energy (ESE) is measurable, ESE values can be 
obtained for each instruction pair. For example, an "ADD/LDM" instruction pair can be 
measured and compared to an "ADD/ADD." Values can be received for nine different 
operations, which can be assembled into a 9x9 table for a total of 81 ESE values at a certain 
carrier frequency. Also, it is useful to know how the ESE values vary with frequency of 
operation. The side-channel energy dependence on frequency should be measured so that the 
electromagnetic field can be predicted at any frequency, based on a baseline frequency metric. 
Finally, the EM fields should be characterized by simulation and experimental measurements. 
EM fields can be simulated using High Frequency Structural Simulation (HFSS). The simulation 
results can then be compared to the measured EM field trace of the processor.  
Circuit layout designers do not account for periodic circuits (loops in software) that form 
at runtime. It is impossible to know what signal path each circuit will take depending on what 
software is being run on the processor. Most of the time, the EM frequency trace caused by code 
at runtime is so insignificant that it does not matter how much EM leakage there is for a segment 
of code. For example, the electromagnetic signal produced by a single instruction pair (i.e. 
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"ADD/SUB") run on an FPGA processor is too small to provide conclusive measurements. 
However, using a different approach, the signal produced by a single instruction pair can also be 
calculated by running instruction A ("ADD") multiple times, running instruction B ("SUB") 
multiple times, and then dividing by the number of instructions. Example pseudo-code for this 
type of signal generation is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 4. Example pseudo-code for the generation of instruction A/B alternation [11]. 
The code requires some key parameters as inputs including: operation type, carrier 
frequency, and duty cycle. Operations are selected based on common assembly level instructions 
run by a processor. Operations used in this experiment include on-chip instructions ADD, SUB, 
MULT, DIV, and NOI, as well as memory accesses, LDM, STM, LDL1, and STL1, which can 
be either on-chip or off-chip depending on the array size accessed. The carrier frequency can be 
tuned by increasing or decreasing the amount of instructions run for instructions A and B. This 
frequency can be tuned to find less noisy parts of the spectrum, so that more accurate 
measurements can be obtained. Noise is created by normal operation of the processor, and there 
are peaks in the frequency spectrum due to other components such as voltage regulators and 
clock cycles. Additionally, the duty cycle can be changed by increasing or decreasing the number 
of times instruction A is performed relative to instruction B. The duty cycle was maintained at 
50% for the measurements in this paper.  
The FPGA or cellphone can be programmed to run these two loops of instructions to 
produce a signal with a measureable peak in the frequency domain. Each operation takes a 
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different route through the processor exciting different wires and transistors to perform the 
computation. This difference in processor activity between the two instructions produces a radio 
frequency (RF) signal at the desired carrier frequency that can be measured on the spectrum 
analyzer. An example of the time-domain waveform of instruction A versus instruction B is 
shown in Figure 2. Intuitively, it can be expected that if instructions A and B are the same 
operation, then no measureable activity can be observed due to there being no difference in 
processor activity. 
 
Figure 5. Time-domain waveform of instruction A versus instruction B. 
A Method for Magnetic Loop Antenna Localization 
Magnetic loop antennas have a size much smaller than the wavelength of the signal being 
transmitted or received (less than 1/10 the wavelength). If the frequency of the signal we are 
measuring is approximately 100 kHz, then its wavelength is well below 1/10 the wavelength of 
the signal. The electromagnetic fields in this experiment are measured using a magnetic 
induction loop probe. The probe orientations are maintained such that the x-orientation measures 
only the x-component of the magnetic field. Induction loop probes work according to Faraday’s 
law of induction [13]. The electromotive force (emf), or the voltage induced in the probe is 
proportional to both the number of turns in the probe and the change in magnetic flux through 
the cross sectional area of the loop. Since the flux through the coil is non-zero along a single 
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coordinate axis, the loop probe only measures one component of the magnetic field. The received 
power is measured in dBm by the spectrum analyzer and converted into Watts.  
 
where P is the power received converted into Watts, R is the impedance of the spectrum analyzer 
(which is approximately 50Ω),  
 
 
N is the number of turns in the coil inductor probe, f is the frequency (which for our purpose is 
the alternation frequency being used in the code ~120kHz), and r is the radius of the probe. 
 





Electromagnetic Side Channel Energy Measurement Setup 
The Altera DE1 Educational FPGA Board is programmed using Nios II 12.1 Software 
Build Tools for Eclipse. Measurements are taken with an orthogonal induction loop probe, 
shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Picture of orthogonal loop probe taking measurements on FPGA processor. 
Data is collected on the Agilent N9020A MXA Signal Analyzer, and the results are 
recorded on the laptop, as shown in Figure 7. Measurements are taken over multiple days and 





Figure 7. Picture of experimental setup. 
Electromagnetic Localization Setup 
 Measured values of the electromagnetic field vary depending on slight changes in 
position or angle of the coil inductor probe measurement axis. To address this problem, the 
measurements were automated using Arduino controlled 2-Dimensional XY plotter with a 
support bracket to position the coil inductor probe anywhere within a 310x390 mm area along a 
z-plane above the device. The measurement setup allows for precise, high-resolution raster scans 
of the electromagnetic field at a constant height and angle above the target device. A picture of 
the measurement setup is shown in Figure 8, in which the device under test (in this case the 
FPGA) is alternating instruction level operations at a rate of 120kHz producing the 
electromagnetic side-channel signal. The XY-plotter scans an area of the device specified by the 









Measurement of ESE values from FPGA 
Some preliminary results show noticeable trends in the ESE values for different 
instruction pairs. Table 1 shows the ESE values measured from the FPGA processor at an 
alternation frequency of 80 kHz. It is worth noting that the values in Table 1 are on the order of 
zepto-joules or 10-21 Joules. Without the methodology described in the methods section above, 
these ESE values are not discernable from the noise floor and are very difficult to measure.  
 
 
Table 1. ESE values on FPGA processor at 80 kHz carrier frequency. 
 In addition, the frequency dependence of the ESE values of each of the operations was 
measured and plotted in Figure 9. The ESE values at 50, 60, 70, and 80 kHz are measured and 
normalized to the ESE values at 40 kHz, and trends can be determined by calculating the slope of 
line of best fit for each of the other alternation frequencies.  
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Figure 9. ESE at various alternation frequencies vs. 40 kHz alternation frequency. 
 Finally, the distance dependence of ESE values is determined by measuring the 
LOAD/ADD received power (in dBm) starting at 20 cm from the FPGA, and moving away from 
the FPGA in 5 cm increments and recording the results. The results in Figure 10 show the 
difference in the theoretical prediction of the distance decay to the actual measurement for 2 ESE 
values: LOAD/ADD and ADD/DIV. The theoretical model is represented by the equation:  
, where a and b are scale constants that depend on a variety of factors 
and have units  and .  
 
Figure 10. Experimental decay rate follows the theoretical prediction of Hertzian dipole and 
magnetic monopole. 
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Electromagnetic source localization 
Some observations recorded when taking measurements of ESE values on the FPGA 
showed that the ESE values vary significantly based on placement and orientation making it 
difficult to obtain repeatable results. Therefore, some error can be reduced through automation of 
the measurement process. Instead of taking measurements manually, the probe can mechanically 
be placed in 3-D plotter and controlled to perform traces of the FPGA board. For this project, the 
XY plotter from Makeblock was chosen due to cost, accuracy, and Arduino controlled stepper 
motors.  
The magnetic field at a z-plane above the loop antenna was measured experimentally and 
simulated in HFSS. A simple loop antenna above a ground plane was excited with 10 dBm and 
the field was measured at a height z=15mm above the ground plane. A simulation was done in 
HFSS using the same port excitation and measurement plane and the results are summarized 
below. Figure 11 shows the loop antenna used in this experiment. The plotter performs an 
automated raster scan over the ground plane at a distance of z=30mm.  
 
Figure 11. Loop antenna above ground plane with Makeblock XY plotter for automated 
measurements. 
 A visual representation of x, y, and z probe orientations is provided in Table 2. It shows 
the orientation of the coil if the observer is looking down upon the measurement setup.  
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Magnetic Field Hx Hy Hz 
Probe Orientation 
   
Table 2. Model of probe orientations as seen from above. 
    
 
Figure 12. Experimental measurements for Hx, Hy, and Hz.  
Loop Antenna Simulation Results 
A picture of the HFSS model setup is shown in Figure 13. The excitation for the 
simulation is a current source where the current is solved for by converting 15 dBm into Watts 
and then solving for current using R=50Ω. The results are plotted in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 13. HFSS loop antenna model as seen from above. 
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Figure 14. Experiment vs Simulation results for x, y, and z-orientations. 
Cellphone Measurement Results 
 The Samsung Galaxy S5 was used for the localization of fields from a smartphone. The 
code run on the phone is the same as the code run on the FPGA and explained in the background 
section of the paper. The transitions in the spectral power content of the signal are shown in 
Table 3. 
Cache L1 = 215 Bytes Cache L2 Little = 219 Bytes Cache L2 Big =224 Bytes 
   
Table 3. Change in spectral power of the signal due to increasing store array size. 
 After choosing a store array size so that there is a Cache L1 miss, but Cache L2 hit, a 
raster scan of the cellphone while transmitting was done in the same manner as the loop antenna 
in the previous section. Results of the raster field scan for the Samsung S5 cellphone are plotted 
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in Figure 15. The left plot is the raster scan data of the cellphone while the right plot shows the 
contour map.  
 





Measurement of ESE values 
The first clearly defined trend is shown on the diagonal of Table 1, starting with 
"LDM/LDM" and extending to the bottom right corner of the table. When the same operation 
(i.e. "STL1/STL1" or "MUL/MUL") is performed in both loops, little discernable signal 
produced. This is expected given that the signals are produced based on differences in processor 
activity, and the same operation does not produce much variation in processor activity. The other 
trend that ESE values show are "LDM" and "STM" operations produce the largest signals. This 
is due to memory accesses requiring more computational power and longer electrical wires to 
access the device's memory storage.  
Another important result is determining the relationship between the ESE values at one 
carrier frequency versus another. For example, if the attacker knew the ESE values at 40 kHz, 
values can be extrapolated at other frequencies within some frequency range given some 
frequency constant. The data gathered in Figure 9 suggests that the ESE values scale linearly in 
frequency with the slope of the line giving the linear frequency scale factor for each set of 
frequencies.  
Theoretical predictions predicted that the electromagnetic emanations from the FPGA 
board are due to a combination of a Hertzian dipole and magnetic monopole source. The 
received power is proportional to the superposition of two sources: a Hertzian dipole and 
magnetic monopole with decay factors of 1/r4 and 1/r6, respectively. This is important to take 
into consideration when designing models for simulating the EM fields coming from a processor. 
Figure 10 shows the experimental measurements compared with theoretical predictions. The 
experimental results reaffirm theoretical predictions and follow approximately the same decay 
rate.  
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Loop Antenna Results  
The radiation patterns displayed in Figure 12 make intuitive sense using a simple check. 
If the receiving loop is oriented to pick up the x-component of the magnetic field, then there 
should be no flux through the receiving loop when it is directly above the transmitting antenna or 
when the receiving loop is moved up and down the y-axis. Also, the fields will cancel along the 
x-axis above the loop, and as a result the fields are strongest along the diagonals. Similar analysis 
for the y- and z-components of the magnetic field verify the plots.  
First observation is that the radiation pattern is the same for experimental and simulation 
results. The results are accurate within an order of magnitude with the HFSS simulation 
producing slightly stronger fields. This is most likely due to parasitics in the receiving coil, as 
well as resistive loss in the antenna. However, these results prove that the simulation is accurate 
for modelling a current loop, and that by modifying the radius and position of the loop, an 
equivalent current loop source can be obtained to model the measured radiated emissions. 
Cellphone Results  
Some important challenges presented during the localization of electromagnetic signals 
from cellphones include multi-core processors, multiple cache sizes, and compact and complex 
PCB layout. The issue of cache size can be solved by performing a memory-access instruction 
such as load/add or store/add and measuring the EM emanations coming from the phone while 
increasing the size of the array being used for the memory access. At a certain array size, there is 
a “cache miss” and the processor has to find larger memory storage to perform the operation, 
resulting in an increase in the electromagnetic signal. For the Samsung Galaxy S5, it is evident 
through EM probing that the size of the smallest cache memory in the phone is about 215 = 
32kB. When controlled for the processor clock cycle, this is the smallest array size that causes a 
sizeable signal, which suggests Cache L1 memory miss. Using the same procedure, it is 
determined that the sizes of Cache L2 Little and Cache L2 Big are 219 = 520kB and 224 = 
16MB, respectively. 
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Because the currents in a cellphone follow traces on the cellphone PCB and do not form a 
perfect loop, the radiation patterns of the cellphone will not look like the ideal loop antenna. The 
radiation patterns can be matched by using different loop sizes, different polar and azimuthal 




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESULTS 
 
In summary, this project successfully demonstrated a methodology for accurately 
measuring the side-channel energy per instruction. This provides a basis for several future 
projects. For example, the code can be run on different processors (cellphones, laptops, FPGAs, 
IoT devices) to characterize the susceptibility of attack for different devices. Future projects may 
also consist of using the side-channel energy per instruction algorithm to modulate strong carrier 
signals found in processors (i.e. clock frequencies, memory frequencies, voltage regulators, etc.). 
When the code is run, information is modulated on each of these carriers leaking information and 
providing a channel of attack. In order to find the total energy available to the attacker, future 
research will focus on finding these carrier signals and integrating over each of the side-bands 
carrying modulated information. 
As for the localization part of the project, the localization model has to be refined and 
rigorously tested against multiple processors. Initial results are promising; however, many other 
factors need to be taken into consideration including operation instruction (LOAD/ADD, 
ADD/SUB, etc.), different transmitting equivalent loop antenna sizes, and different loop 
orientations. Once the localization model is verified, then optimizations can be made to the 
measurement process. For example, a few points around the edge of the board can be used to 
localize the loop without having to take a raster scan of the entire board. This saves time when 
performing measurements, and can be used when trying to locate the max signal radiating from a 
processor. Side-channels are a new and developing research area and there are many problems 
that need to be solved. Many of the problems are interdisciplinary and require extensive 
knowledge in computer architecture, electromagnetic radiation and propagation, electronic test 
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